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SI Materials and Methods
I. Behavioral Analysis. a. Stability of ψ.To assess whether ourmeasure
of baseline suspicion, ψ, was, in fact, a baseline measure and stable
over the course of the task, we reestimated ψ (R2 from the re-
gression of prices on suggestion modulo and the SD of buyer sug-
gestions multiplied by −1) separately for the ﬁrst one-half and
second one-half of the experiment (ψlate and ψearly). These in-
dependent estimates are highly correlated (r=0.74, P< 10−13), and
a paired t test shows no signiﬁcant difference (jtj < 10−13, P ∼ 1),
indicating that this measure is fairly stable over the task. To further
test the possibility that, despite regressing out effects of the spread
of buyer suggestions, this measure might still reﬂect an increase or
decrease in suspicion as a function of buyer behavior, we compared
the difference between early and latemeasures of suspicion (ψearly−
ψlate) with the SD of buyer suggestions and found no signiﬁcant
correlation (r= −0.08, P= 0.48). A scatter plot is shown in Fig. S1.
b. Full cognitive hierarchy model. In the full cognitive hierarchy (CH)
model, we followed the model established in the work by Bhatt
et al. (1), which is restated from that paper below with the in-
clusion of the mathematical descriptions of levels 2 and 3 seller
behaviors. In cognitive hierarchy models, players perform dif-
ferent numbers of steps of thinking to form beliefs. Zero step or
level 0 thinkers behave naïvely—randomly in the original for-
mulation—and lack a model of how other players with behave.
Level 1 thinkers assume that they are playing level 0 players and
best respond to naïve behavior. Level n thinkers think that they
are playing a mixture of players from all of the n − 1 levels below
them and best respond to that mixture.
In our model, we assume that level 0 buyers have a ﬁxed type, α,
distributed u(0, 1). Level 0 buyers will, thus, send suggestions s
according to
s ¼ minð10;maxð1; ½αvþ εÞÞ [S1]
and ε∼Nð0; σ2Þ. Level 0 sellers are assumed to be naïve and
respond to a buyer suggestion s with a price quote p according to
p ¼ minð10;maxð1; ½sþ εÞÞ [S2]
and ε∼Nð0; σ2Þ. Here, ½x is the nearest integer function. We add
the maximum/minimum operations to account for the fact that
both price and suggestion must be integer-valued and between 1
and 10. Let F denote the cumulative normal distribution func-
tion with mean = 0 and variance σ2. Then, these assumptions
translate to the conditional distributions
P0−buyer

sjv; α ¼ Fsþ :5− αv−Fs− :5− αv [S3]
for 1 < s < 10,
P0−buyer

1jv; α ¼ F1:5− αv; [S4]
and
P0−buyer

10jv; α ¼ 1−F9:5− αv [S5]
and
P0−sellerðpjsÞ ¼ Fð pþ :5− sÞ−Fð p− :5− sÞ [S6]
for 1 < p < 10,
P0−sellerð1j sÞ ¼ Fð1:5− sÞ [S7]
and
P0−sellerð10j sÞ ¼ 1−Fð9:5− sÞ: [S8]
Intuitively, level 0 buyers suggest a price that is a fraction α (<1)
of their value plus noise. This price represents shaving bids, a
behavior commonly observed in auctions of this type (2).
We assume that level 1 buyers respond (optimally with noise)
to level 0 sellers according to the softmax distribution:
P1−buyerðsjvÞ ¼
exp

λπ1−buyer

s; v

P
s′
exp

λπ1−buyer

s′; v
: [S9]
In this expression, π1−buyer(v, s) is the expected payoff given value
v and suggestion s if you are a level 1 buyer:
π1−buyerðv; sÞ ¼
X
p< v
P0−sellerðpjsÞðv− pÞ: [S10]
Level 1 sellers are assumed to also respond optimally to level
0 buyers. However, they have the extra computational challenge
of updating their priors about the value of α, and therefore,
their choice of price depends on the current suggestion and
also the entire history of suggestions (and the sensible infer-
ence of how much information about value that the sugges-
tions have generally implied). They respond according to the
distributions
P1−sellerð pjfstgÞ ¼ expðλπ1−sellerðpjfstgÞÞP
p′
expðλπ1−sellerðp′jfstgÞÞ [S11]
and
π1−sellerð pjfstgÞ ¼ p ·Pðv ≥ pÞ
¼ p
X
v≥ p
P0−buyer

vjst: [S12]
We ﬁnd the distribution P0−buyerðv; fstgÞ in two steps. First, we
determine the posterior over α at time t using Bayesian updating
iteratively:
PðαjfstgÞ ¼ PðstjαÞPðαjfst−1gÞR1
0
Pðstjα′ÞPðα′jfst−1gÞdα′
; [S13]
where
PðsjαÞ ¼
X10
v¼1
P0−buyer

sjv; α: [S14]
Second, we use this posterior over α to ﬁnd a posterior over
values
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P0−buyerðvjfstgÞ ¼
R1
0
Pðvjα; stÞPðα jfstgÞdα
P10
v′¼1
R1
0
Pðv′jα; stÞPðα jfstgÞdα
; [S15]
where
Pðvjα; sÞ ¼ P0−buyer

sjv; αP10
v′¼1
P0−buyer

sjv′; α: [S16]
Level 2 buyers respond optimally to a 50/50mixture of levels 0 and
1 sellers. Importantly, level 2 buyers anticipate how their sug-
gestions will change a level 1 seller’s posterior over α and how
these changes will affect payoffs in the next period.* To get
probabilities of buyer’s suggestions, we plug expected payoffs
given these beliefs into a softmax function like we did for level 1
buyers and sellers:
P2−buyerðstjv; fst−1gÞ ¼
exp

λπ2−buyer

stjv;

st−1

P
s′
exp

λπ2;buyer

s′jv;st−1: [S17]
Here,
π2−buyer

stjv;

st−1
 ¼ Current Payoff þ Future Payoff; [S18]
where
Current Payoff ¼ :5
 X
p< v
P1−sellerðpjfstgÞðv− pÞ
!
þ :5
 X
p< v
P0−sellerðpjstÞðv− pÞ
!
; [S19]
and
Similarly, level 2 sellers respond optimally to mixture of levels
0 and 1 buyers. However, because the sellers do not need to
anticipate the effects of their behavior on the buyers, their
computation is extremely similar to the computation for level 1
sellers.
We once again ﬁnd the distribution Pbuyerðv; fstgÞ in two
steps. First, we determine the posterior over buyer type, which
now includes potential values of α, and the possibility that the
buyer is level 1 at time t using Bayesian updating iteratively:
PðtypejfstgÞ ¼
PðstjtypeÞPðtypejfst−1gÞ
Pðstjlevel− 1ÞPðlevel− 1jfst−1gÞ þ
R1
0
Pðstjα′ÞPðα′jfst−1gÞdα′
;
[S21]
where
PðsjαÞ ¼
X10
v¼1
P0−buyer

sjv; α [S22]
and
Pðsjlevel− 1Þ ¼
X10
v¼1
P1−buyer

sjv: [S23]
Second, we assume an initial distribution of 50% level 1 buyers,
with the remaining 50% as level 0 buyers with uniformly dis-
tributed α.
We once again use this posterior over α to ﬁnd a posterior over
values
which we can then use to compute the expected payoff to each
price and the softmax function to derive the predicted distribution
of behaviors:
P2−sellerðpjfstgÞ ¼ expðλπ2−sellerðpjfstgÞÞP
p′
expðλπ2−sellerðp′jfstgÞÞ [S25]
and
π2−sellerðpjfstgÞ ¼ p ·Pðv ≥ pÞ
¼ p
X
v≥ p
Pbuyer

vjst: [S26]
Finally, level 3 sellers best respond to a mixture of levels 0, 1, and 2
buyers. This response is, once again, effectively the same compu-
tation as theone for level 2 sellerswith theadditionof thepossibility
Future Payoff ¼
P
vtþ1maxstþ1
P
p< vtþ1ð:5P1−sellerðpjfstþ1gÞ þ :5P0−sellerðpjstþ1ÞÞðv− pÞ

10
: [S20]
PbuyerðvjfstgÞ ¼
P1−buyerðvjstÞPðlevel− 1jfstgÞ þ
R1
0
Pðvjα; stÞPðαjfstgÞdα
P10
v′¼1
 
P1−buyerðv′jstÞPðlevel− 1jfstgÞ þ
R1
0
Pðv′jα; stÞPðαjfstgÞdα
!; [S24]
*Because we are assuming limited hierarchical reasoning throughout, we only have level
2 sellers project one period into the future rather than considering the entire experi-
mental run. We consider only one period of forecasting, because adding more periods
does not signiﬁcantly change predicted choices but does become too computationally
taxing to estimate. Time to estimate the level 2 model grows exponentially with the
number or periods ahead considered.
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that buyers could be level 2 and the initial assumption that buyer
types were distributed as 40% level 0, 40% level 1, and 20% level 2
(the approximate empirical distribution of incrementalists, con-
servatives, and strategists on the buyer side of the experiment).†
As with the buyers in the work by Bhatt et al. (1), we classiﬁed
each of the sellers according to this full CH model. To simplify
the computations, we approximated the initial uniform distri-
bution over α with a discrete, even distribution over the points (0,
0.05, . . . , 0.95, 1). Because it was difﬁcult to distinguish the two
sources of noise, σ and λ, we ﬁxed σ = 2 and computed the
maximum likelihood estimate for λ for levels 1, 2, and 3 be-
haviors. The computed log likelihoods and implied types are
reported in Table S1.
Forty of the sellers were classiﬁed as level 1; only 11 sellers were
classiﬁed as level 3. Notice that, of these 11 sellers, it was difﬁcult
to distinguish between levels 2 and 3 designations; for 8 of 11 level
3 subjects, the log likelihood that they were a level 2 seller was
within one log likelihood that they were a level 3 seller. The three
subjects for whom this ﬁnding was not the case are highlighted in
bold in Table S1. This difﬁculty arises because of the low prob-
ability of level 2 buyers; levels 2 and 3 behaviors generally do not
differ signiﬁcantly. Interestingly, in the most signiﬁcant case of
level 3 seller behavior (134-DH-2), the buyer in question was
a strategist who almost exclusively sent suggestions of either 1 or
10, making his deception more obvious to the seller. However, he
was one of only two strategists who elicited level 3 behavior from
the corresponding seller.
In fact, because of the difﬁculty in establishing clear differences
between levels 2 and 3 seller behaviors along with the similarity
between level 1 and low-slope level 0 buyers, most of the im-
portant aspects of sophisticated seller behavior are captured by
the level 1 model, which was indicated by the fact that themajority
of sellers were classiﬁed as level 1.‡ Naïve seller behavior is
largely captured by the gross measure of baseline suspicion de-
scribed in the text.
c. Simpliﬁed model of seller behavior. To select a single model for
seller behavior that addresses the important aspects of inference
about buyer types, we used the level 1 model for seller behavior
from the full cognitive hierarchy model described. Recall that the
level 1 sellers modeled buyer behavior by assuming that they
chose suggestions according to Eq. S1 and ε∼Nð0; σ2Þ, where α is
initially assumed to be drawn from the uniform distribution on
the points (0, 0.05, 0.1 . . . , 0.95, 1). In addition, using the model
used in the work by Bhatt et al. (1), we simplify the model by
assuming that sellers have limited memory and only used the
previous trial along with the current trial’s suggestions. For all
trials, t > 2:
Pðαjst; st−1Þ ¼ PðstjαÞ ·Pðαjst− 1ÞP
α′
Pðstjα′Þ ·Pðα′jst−1Þ; [S27]
where
stjα ¼ 110
X10
i¼1
minð10;maxð1; ½α · iþ εÞÞ [S28]
and ε ∼ Nð0; σ2Þ. Therefore,
Pðst ¼ 10jαÞ ¼ 110
X10
i¼1
Pð½α·iþ ε> 10Þ ¼ 1
10
X10
i¼1
Pðε> 10:5− α·iÞ;
[S29]
and similarly, st ¼ 1; 2; 3 . . ..
A buyer with α = 0 will choose s = min(10, max(1, [1 + ε]) in
each round (i.e., they will generally send low suggestions), al-
though they may occasionally send a higher suggestion because
of noise. More importantly, these suggestions will contain no
information about v. This ﬁnding reﬂects the conservative group
observed in buyers. If, however, α = 1, the buyer would be
sending s = min(10, max(1, [v + ε]) (i.e., they will be sending
a highly reliable signal of v, reﬂecting the incrementalist group
observed in the buyer).
The entropy of the seller’s belief distribution gives us a trial-by-
trial measure of the seller’s strategic uncertainty about the
buyer’s credibility. The higher the entropy, the less certain that
the seller is about the value of α (i.e., the buyer’s type).
II. Functional MRI Analysis. We considered two general linear
models. Key presses, head motion, and time derivatives were
included as nuisance regressors in both models. The ﬁrst model
used a boxcar regressor beginning at trial onset and ending at
decision parameterized by the buyer’s suggestion and the seller’s
chosen price. The second model used separate point regressors
at trial onset and decision, and both regressors were parame-
terized by strategic uncertainty as deﬁned by the entropy mea-
sure deﬁned above. All regressors were convolved with the
standard hemodynamic response function.
a. Second level analysis for the ﬁrst model. At the second level, we
regressed the coefﬁcients of the boxcar regressor for each subject
on two subject-level parameters: baseline suspicion (ψ) and the
SD of suggestions (ζ). The results of the whole-brain analysis as
well as the P values corrected in the small volumes around the
left and right amygdala [20-mm spheres around the foci identi-
ﬁed in the work by Winston et al. (4)] are presented below in
Tables S2 and S3.
b. Second level analysis for the second model. At the second level, we
performed a t test on the coefﬁcients of the regressor describing
strategic uncertainty (entropy of the seller’s belief distribution
about buyer type) at trial onset. Results from the whole-brain
analysis are shown below in Tables S4 and S5. We performed
a similar analysis looking at strategic uncertainty at the end of
each trial and found no signiﬁcant correlates.
1. Bhatt MA, Lohrenz T, Camerer CF, Montague PR (2010) Neural signatures of strategic
types in a two-person bargaining game. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107:19720–19725.
2. Camerer CF (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).
3. Camerer CF, Ho TH, Chong J (2004) A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Q J Econ
119:861–898.
4. Winston JS, Strange BA, O’Doherty J, Dolan RJ (2002) Automatic and intentional brain
responses during evaluation of trustworthiness of faces. Nat Neurosci 5:277–283.
†This distribution also corresponds to the Poisson distribution with a mean = 1 truncated
after k = 2. The work by Camerer et al. (3) found that truncated Poisson distributions were
highly effective for modeling hierarchical beliefs across a variety of economic games,
although it generally found higher average levels of thinking (generally around 1.5).
‡This ﬁnding is in contrast to the buyers where level 2 behavior was very distinct from
levels 1 and 0 behaviors, and none of the three behavioral types composed a majority of
the subject pool.
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Fig. S1. Scatter plot showing the change in our measure of baseline suspicion from the ﬁrst one-half to the second one-half of the experiment (ψearly − ψlate)
vs. apparent buyer credibility as measured by the SD of buyer suggestions (ζ). This measure for baseline suspicion does seem to be relatively stable over the
course of the experiment.
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Table S1. Cognitive hierarchy classiﬁcation of sellers
Subject Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level
134-AC-2 −106.8174 −127.0613 <Random <Random 0
134-AR-2 −122.3142 −132.5487 −136.0253 −136.953 0
134-BC-3 −103.4071 −126.4562 −138.0808 <Random 0
134-BJ-2 −108.8865 −137.0785 <Random <Random 0
134-BK-2 −119.2186 −131.8758 −136.9712 −137.9815 0
134-BW-2 −122.4997 −136.5915 <Random <Random 0
134-BX-2 −104.5955 −134.8317 <Random <Random 0
134-DB-2 −115.3072 −119.1418 −133.6789 −134.9156 0
134-DC-2 −116.3968 −130.6039 −134.328 −135.2816 0
134-DJ-2 −81.5393 −128.8701 <Random <Random 0
134-DX-2 −108.1966 −135.1077 <Random <Random 0
134-DY-2 −106.1546 −109.8431 −111.0189 −112.0976 0
134-EI-2 −100.0469 −134.3433 <Random <Random 0
134-AB-2 −114.854 −98.1297 −104.7865 −109.6967 1
134-AE-2 <Random −131.1564 −134.3255 −134.7318 1
134-AF-2 <Random −128.9398 −129.8736 −130.4187 1
134-AI-2 <Random −110.0546 −124.588 −125.6438 1
134-AO-2 <Random −119.6347 −120.7794 −121.5324 1
134-AU-2 <Random −137.0235 <Random <Random 1
134-AX-2 −137.4398 −136.0846 <Random <Random 1
134-BA-2 −133.9392 −108.3655 −121.2936 −125.6717 1
134-BB-2 <Random −108.8721 −124.2451 −125.7956 1
134-BD-2 −125.3838 −86.2033 −94.1091 −99.4096 1
134-BL-2 −113.5135 −112.7341 −122.75 −126.4204 1
134-BO-2 −120.7309 −73.8218 −83.4424 −88.1004 1
134-BP-2 <Random −132.2405 −133.5009 −133.7215 1
134-BZ-2 <Random −103.1744 −120.8822 −123.1841 1
134-CB-2 <Random −95.3303 −101.5943 −104.2174 1
134-CG-2 −124.7602 −109.1877 −120.534 −124.6107 1
134-CJ-2 −134.0757 −88.2471 −102.6854 −109.7257 1
134-CP-2 <Random −123.9304 −124.2111 −125.6845 1
134-CQ-2 −118.0516 −111.9241 −128.4242 −130.9061 1
134-CT-2 <Random −135.3941 <Random <Random 1
134-CZ-2 −128.4419 −122.137 −123.4078 −124.24 1
134-DD-2 <Random −135.7052 −137.3513 −137.5997 1
134-DE-2 −117.1744 −98.2949 −106.8795 −112.0722 1
134-DF-2 <Random −131.8471 −132.9129 −133.4078 1
134-DK-2 <Random −123.9283 −128.7967 −131.1683 1
134-DL-2 −115.673 −108.7484 −128.0194 −129.7061 1
134-DN-2 −127.1374 −117.8162 −132.9576 −134.0834 1
134-DO-2 <Random −134.5577 −137.4827 −137.9391 1
134-DP-2 <Random −131.1765 −131.2393 −131.3563 1
134-DS-2 <Random −67.857 −68.6519 −72.2977 1
134-EB-2 <Random −115.9181 −122.2969 −122.8336 1
134-ED-2 −126.585 −119.9537 −130.2428 −131.5336 1
134-EH-2 −120.1115 −96.8339 −102.8378 −107.8266 1
134-EK-2 −121.3431 −97.9014 −103.7761 −106.7096 1
134-EN-2 <Random −121.2574 −129.7981 −131.3573 1
134-EP-2 <Random −129.1772 −129.4076 −129.6593 1
134-EQ-2 −120.9754 −89.3885 −100.8305 −106.3542 1
134-EU-3 <Random −116.052 −119.4288 −120.8747 1
134-EW-2 <Random −113.2095 −122.6153 −126.1442 1
134-EY-2 <Random −123.9219 −125.8229 −127.9851 1
134-AT-2 <Random −136.6766 −136.3238 −136.4388 2
134-BG-2 −130.4035 −63.3689 −59.2239 −60.6599 2
134-CK-2 <Random −112.3277 −110.4442 −111.0446 2
134-CL-2 <Random −120.8048 −115.9686 −116.6334 2
134-EX-3 −118.2926 −114.7925 −112.9957 −113.2835 2
134-AA-2 <Random −122.5903 −120.218 −119.4873 3
134-AK-3 <Random −112.7717 −111.0908 −110.9972 3
134-AM-2 <Random −99.2614 −94.1085 −92.9185 3
134-AQ-2 <Random −132.3805 −121.8424 −119.3609 3
134-AS-2 <Random −132.7282 −128.018 −127.5092 3
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Table S1. Cont.
Subject Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level
134-BM-2 −131.3771 −106.3772 −102.915 −102.7003 3
134-DG-2 <Random −88.9402 −74.2562 −73.4059 3
134-DH-2 <Random −136.6534 −114.5722 −111.4 3
134-EG-2 <Random −127.5317 −118.2782 −117.457 3
134-ES-2 −117.0427 −110.383 −108.3387 −108.0509 3
134-V-2 <Random −129.5456 −126.5015 −125.9305 3
134-BY-2 <Random <Random <Random <Random None
134-CF-2 <Random <Random <Random <Random None
134-CX-3 <Random <Random <Random <Random None
134-DW-2 <Random <Random <Random <Random None
134-ER-2 <Random <Random <Random <Random None
The majority of sellers (54%) were classiﬁed as level 1 using the full cognitive hierarchy (CH) model. The three
subjects for whom the log likelihood that they were a level 2 seller was not within one log likelihood that they
were a level 3 seller are highlighted in bold.
Table S2. Between-subject correlates to ψ: Negative correlates to ψ (whole-brain analysis)
Region x y z k t P P (FWE) SVC P (FWE)
Right amygdala 20 4 −12 18 4.29 2.77E-05 0.24 0.005
Left amygdala −16 0 −16 11 3.89 1.12E-04 0.57 0.030
Cluster sizes (k) are shown at P < 0.001 uncorrected. Corrections for family-wise error (FWE) are shown for the
peak voxel in each cluster. Small-volume correction (SVC) was done for the 20-mm spheres around (18, 0, −24)
and (−16, −4, −20) for the right and left amygdala, respectively.
Table S3. Between-subject correlates to ζ: Negative correlates to ζ (whole-brain analysis)
Region x y z k t P P (FWE)
Inferior frontal gyrus 60 −4 28 13 4.06 6.21E-05 0.52
Cluster sizes (k) are shown at P < 0.001 uncorrected. Corrections for family-wise error (FWE) are shown for the
peak voxel in each cluster. Small-volume correction was done for the 20-mm spheres around (18, 0, −24) and
(−16, −4, −20) for the right and left amygdala, respectively.
Table S4. Within-subject correlates to the entropy of trial-by-trial beliefs about buyer type
(strategic uncertainty): Positive correlates to entropy of beliefs about buyer type (strategic
uncertainty)
Region x y z k t P P (FWE) P (cluster)
Left parahippocampus −20 −36 −12 16 4.44 1.58E-05 0.335 0.046
Right parahippocampus 32 −40 −12 28 4.03 6.77E-05 0.843 0.004
Middle temporal gyrus 44 −68 12 11 4.01 7.33E-05 0.861 0.152
Cluster sizes (k) are shown at P < 0.001 uncorrected. Corrections for family-wise error (FWE) are shown for the
peak voxel in each cluster. Cluster corrections are shown for P < 0.001 and k > 5.
Table S5. Within-subject correlates to the entropy of trial-by-trial beliefs about buyer type
(strategic uncertainty): Negative correlates to entropy
Region x y z k t P P (FWE) P (cluster)
Brodmann area 6 24 8 64 13 4.51 1.20E-05 0.256 0.093
Cluster sizes (k) are shown at P < 0.001 uncorrected. Corrections for family-wise error (FWE) are shown for the
peak voxel in each cluster. Cluster corrections are shown for P < 0.001 and k > 5.
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